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THE USE OF PORT STATE CONTROL IN
MARITIME INDUSTRY AND APPLICATION OF
THE PARIS MOU
Dr. Z. Oya Özçayr*

I. INTRODUCTION
Port state control is the control of foreign flagged ships in national
ports by Port State Control Officers (PSCO). It is frequently asserted that
port state control would be unnecessary in an ideal world. This assertion,
however, does not reflect reality, and in many cases people are forced by
the authorities to act within the law. A similar principle applies to the
shipping world as well. In many cases, shipowners and ship managers are
forced to act within the law. Because control systems used by other players
in the shipping world have been unable to eradicate all substandard vessels
from the seas, port state control systems have become more effective and
have provided a safety net of last resort.
Port state control is not, and can never be, a substitute for the proper
exercise of flag state responsibility. Flag states have the primary
responsibility of safeguarding against substandard ships. When flag states
fail to meet their commitments, port states must act as the last safety net in
the control system.

*. Dr. Özçayr is a freelance Maritime Law Consultant and author both in the United
Kingdom and Turkey. She is the editor of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
section of the Journal of International Maritime Law and is a member of the editorial board
of the Maritime Risk International. She has taught at Cardiff University Law School in
England and has worked as a visiting lecturer at Economy University in zmir, Turkey. She
is the author of two books. Her first book, Liability for Oil Pollution and Collisions, was
published by LLP in 1998. Her second book, Port State Control, was published by LLP in
2001.
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II. THE SAFETY NET
The port state safety net consists of many elements:
-

International Conventions of the International Maritime
Organization (IMO);
The Conventions of the International Labour Organization;
Flag State Control;
Classification Societies;
The Marine Insurance Industry; and
Port State Control.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency
of the United Nations, began to advance international treaties and other
legislation concerning marine safety and pollution prevention in the 1950s
in order to develop international standards that would replace the
multiplicity of national legislation that then existed. The IMO has produced
a mass of legislation, and the majority of the world tonnage is a member of
these conventions. Under the IMO Conventions, flag states have the
primary responsibility for providing structurally safe and environmentally
compliant ships. IMO statistics indicate that the shipping industry is
ratifying new conventions and that the international community is adopting
necessary legislation.1
SUMMARY OF STATUS OF CONVENTIONS2
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2008

Instrument
IMO Convention
SOLAS 1974
SOLAS Protocol 1978
SOLAS Protocol 1988
Stockholm Agreement
1996
LL 1966
LL Protocol 1988
TONNAGE 1969

Entry into
force date
17-Mar-58
25-May-80
01-May-81
03-Feb-00

No. of
Contracting
States
168
158
114
91

% world tonnage*
97.22
99.04
96.16
93.63

01-Apr-97
21-Jul-68
03-Feb-00
18-Jul-82

11
158
87
148

8.59
99.01
93.85
98.85

1. See International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org/conventions/
mainframe.asp?Topic_id=247 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (showing the number of
international conventions adopted by the IMO).
2. Id.
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COLREG 1972
CSC 1972
1993 amendments
SFV Protocol 1993
STCW 1978
STCW-F 1995
SAR 1979
STP 1971
SPACE STP 1973
INMARSAT C 1976
INMARSAT OA 1976
1994 amendments
2006 amendments
FAL 1965
MARPOL 73/78
(Annex I/II)
MARPOL 73/78
(Annex III)
MARPOL 73/78
(Annex IV)
MARPOL 73/78
(Annex V)
MARPOL Protocol
1997 (Annex VI)
LC 1972
1978 amendments
LC Protocol 1996
INTERVENTION
1969
INTERVENTION
Protocol 1973
CLC 1969
CLC Protocol 1976
CLC Protocol 1992
FUND Protocol 1976
FUND Protocol 1992
FUND Protocol 2000
FUND Protocol 2003
NUCLEAR 1971
PAL 1974
PAL Protocol 1976
PAL Protocol 1990
PAL Protocol 2002
LLMC 1976
LLMC Protocol 1996
SUA 1988
SUA Protocol 1988
SUA 2005
SUA Protocol 2005
SALVAGE 1989
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15-Jul-77
06-Sep-77
28-Apr-84
22-Jun-85
02-Jan-74
02-Jun-77
16-Jul-79
16-Jul-79
05-Mar-67

152
78
9
16
151
11
93
17
16
93
89
40
1
114

98.35
60.95
6.18
19.73
99.00
4.87
49.86
23.98
23.33
93.25
91.63
26.91
0.03
90.31

02-Oct-83

148

99.00

01-Jul-92

130

95.07

27-Sep-03

121

80.75

31-Dec-88

137

96.98

19-May-05
30-Aug-75
24-Mar-06

54
85
20
36

82.65
67.09
17.49
30.53

06-May-75

86

74.40

30-Mar-83
19-Jun-75
08-Apr-81
30-May-96
22-Nov-94
30-May-96
27-Jun-01
03-Mar-05
15-Jul-75
28-Apr-87
30-Apr-89
01-Dec-86
13-May-04
01-Mar-92
01-Mar-92
14-Jul-96

53
38
53
121
31
103
23
17
32
25
6
4
51
33
151
139
8
6
57

48.67
2.89
56.41
96.39
47.33
94.12
19.84
20.38
40.80
40.46
0.85
0.17
48.97
35.37
92.75
87.77
5.53
5.42
47.16
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OPRC 1990
13-May-95
97
67.03
HNS Convention 1996
13
13.64
OPRC/HNS 2000
14-Jun-07
23
30.88
BUNKERS
Convention 2001
21-Nov-08
33
51.26
AFS Convention 2001 17-Sep-08
35
62.69
BWM Convention
2004
17
15.35
NAIROBI WR
Convention 2007
*Source: Lloyd's Register/Fairplay World Fleet Statistics 31 December 2007

Despite the existence of many new conventions, the application and
enforcement of international legislation remains a continuing problem on
the maritime agenda. As a general rule, each state that ratifies an international convention is responsible for the convention’s implementation.
Moreover, governments ratifying international instruments are obligated to
incorporate the provisions into their national legislation. In practice,
however, the enforcement of international conventions raises many
problems. For instance, the conventions may take a long time to be
incorporated into the national legal system of each state; there may be
inconsistencies between the convention and the implementing legislation;
or implementation of a convention may not be a priority of the member
state. Therefore, the origination of a convention does not always translate
into its implementation and effective enforcement.
III. FLAG STATE RESPONSIBILITY3
The national flag constitutes the primary source of state responsibility
for a ship.4 Flag states are required to ensure that their ships comply with
the standards accepted by flag states under international law and
conventions.5 Under international law, flag states are primarily responsible
for ensuring compliance with international minimum standards. This
means that a flag state’s ships are to be operated and maintained in a
manner that minimizes the risk to seafarers, the marine environment, and
the cargo.6 Article 94 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law

3. See generally Z. OYA ÖZÇAYR, LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION AND COLLISIONS 1021 (1998).
4. Id. at 11.
5. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 94, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS 1982].
6. See id.

2009]

Port State Control

205

of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982), establishes flag states’ fundamental duties,7
and Article 94(5) requires flag states to take any steps necessary to secure
observance with generally accepted international regulations, procedures,
and practices.8

7. Id.
8. Id. In describing the duties of flag states, Article 94 states:
1. Every State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. In particular every State shall:
(a) maintain a register of ships containing the names and particulars of ships
flying its flag, except those which are excluded from generally accepted
international regulations on account of their small size; and
(b) assume jurisdiction under its internal law over each ship flying its flag and
its master, officers and crew in respect of administrative, technical and
social matters concerning the ship.
3. Every State shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as are necessary to
ensure safety at sea with regard, inter alia, to:
(a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships;
(b) the manning of ships, labor conditions and the training of crews, taking into
account the applicable international instruments;
(c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention
of collisions.
4. Such measures shall include those necessary to ensure:
(a) that each ship, before registration and thereafter at appropriate intervals is
surveyed by a qualified surveyor of ships, and has on board such charts,
nautical publications and navigational equipment and instruments as are
appropriate for the safe navigation of the ship;
(b) that each ship is in charge of a master and officers who possess appropriate
qualifications, in particular in seamanship, navigation, communications and
marine engineering, and that the crew is appropriate in qualification and
numbers for the type, size, machinery and equipment of the ship;
(c) that the master, officers and, to the extent appropriate, the crew are fully
conversant with and required to observe the applicable international
regulations concerning safety of life at sea, the prevention of collisions, the
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution, and the maintenance
of communications by radio.
5. In taking the measures called for in paragraphs 3 and 4 each State is required to
conform generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices
and to take any steps which may be necessary to secure their observance.
6. A State which has clear grounds to believe that proper jurisdiction and control
with respect to a ship have not been exercised may report the facts to the flag
state. Upon receiving such a report, the flag State shall investigate the matter
and, if appropriate, take any necessary action necessary to remedy the situation.
7. Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably qualified
person or persons into every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the
high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury
to nationals of another State or to the marine environment. The flag State and the
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These international regulations include those related to the safety of life at
sea, the prevention of collisions, the prevention, reduction, and control of
marine pollution, and the maintenance of communications by radio.9 These
rules are applicable to all ships on the national register.
In practice, flag states issue vessels safety certificates, which indicate
compliance with international conventions.10 Flag states are able to ensure
that vessels meet international requirements by conducting periodic surveys
and through the process of renewing ships’ various certificates.11 These
certificates constitute the core elements for the port state control system.
Similarly, Article 217(1) of UNCLOS 1982 articulates flag state
responsibility for effective enforcement of international rules, standards,
and regulations, irrespective of where a violation occurs.12 A flag state,
however, cannot exercise jurisdiction over a foreign vessel, which has
caused pollution, beyond the limits of any state’s territorial jurisdiction.13
Article 218 of UNCLOS 1982 extends port state jurisdiction to close this
gap.14 Articles 218, 219, and 220 of UNCLOS 1982 deal with the enforcement of applicable international rules and standards for the protection of
the marine environment by port states and coastal states “[w]hen a vessel
is voluntarily within a port or at an off-shore terminal”15 of that state.16
For a considerable period of time, the shipping community relied on
flag states to control their ships. This approach became impracticable with
the advent of flags of convenience. Flag states increasingly relied on

other State shall co-operate in the conduct of any inquiry held by that other State
into any such marine casualty or incident of navigation.
Id.
9. Id. art. 94(5).
10. Id. arts. 94(4), 217(1), (3).
11. Id. art. 217(1), (3).
12. Article 217(1) discusses flag state enforcement of vessel compliance:
States shall ensure compliance by vessels flying their flag or of their registry with
applicable international rules and standards, established through the competent
international organization or diplomatic conference, and with their laws and
regulations adopted in accordance with this Convention for the prevention, reduction
and control of pollution of the marine environment from vessels and shall accordingly
adopt laws and regulations and take other measures necessary for their implementation. Flag states shall provide for the effective enforcement of such rules, standards,
laws and regulations, irrespective of where a violation occurs.
Id.
13. Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 2, Apr. 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
14. UNCLOS 1982, supra note 5, art. 218.
15. Id. art. 218(1).
16. Id. arts. 218, 219, 220.
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classification societies to regulate and control the standards laid down by
the IMO. The control mechanisms applied by flag states and classification
societies have been unable to remove all substandard vessels from the
industry.
A clear example of the system’s failure, particularly the deficiencies in
the international safety net, is illustrated by the San Marco case.17 The San
Marco, originally known as the MV Soral, was a 1968 Panamax dry bulk
carrier.18 It was owned by a succession of one ship brass plate companies.19
In March 1991, it was sold for $3.2 million to a company named Sea
Management.20 The vessel was then traded as the San Marco under the
ownership of another brass plate company, Shipping of Nicosia, Cyprus.21
In May 1993, it was detained by the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) for
serious defects related to the structural integrity of the ship, in addition to
its fire suppression and life preservation mechanisms.22 Following this
incident, the vessel’s protection and indemnity Club withdrew their
insurance coverage.23 Because the owner would not do the immediate
repairs, its classification society, Bureau Veritas (BV), withdrew its class
after an inspection.24
In May of 1993, the vessel was inspected by the Hellenic Register for
a class transfer from BV.25 The vessel was found to be in “‘good condition
and well-maintained’” and was issued clean class certificates, which were
valid until 1995.26 A month after the inspection, the CCG allowed the San
Marco to depart from Vancouver, under tow, at the request of the
shipowner.27 Although the Hellenic Register issued a clean class certificate
and the vessel had BV certificates valid until 1995, the CCG only allowed
the vessel to be towed unmanned.28 The CCG had no legal power to
compel the owner to perform repairs locally.29 Soon after leaving Canadian
waters, the tow to San Marco was cut and a crew was put on board by a
helicopter. From then on, the unrepaired vessel, with clean HRS

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Ian Middleton, Holes in the System, SEATRADE REV. MONTHLY, Jan. 1994, at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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certificates, continued to trade.30 Obviously, if the Canadian port state had
the legal power to demand repairs before departure, the vessel would have
been prevented from trading in a dangerously unseaworthy condition. As
this was not the case, the San Marco managed to slip through the safety net.
In November of 1993, while the San Marco was 150-200 miles off the
South African coast on a voyage from Morocco to Indonesia, she lost 14x7
meters of shell plating from both sides of her No.1 hold and all the cargo
in that hold.31 The ship was put into Cape Town as a port of refuge and
was detained by the South African Department of Transport.32 As it was
not possible for the vessel to continue its trade functions without spending
substantial amounts of money on repairs, the vessel was subsequently sold
for scrap at a public auction.
As illustrated by the San Marco case, shipowners, classification
societies, insurers, and flag state administrators failed to properly perform
their jobs. Port state control would be unnecessary if all interested parties
acted responsibly and prudently. The control mechanisms applied by the
flag states and classification societies have proven insufficient in
eliminating all substandard vessels from the industry.
IV. MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING
A. The History of Regional Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs)
The origins of port state control lie in the memorandum of understanding that was signed in Hague in 1978, between eight North Sea states.
The memorandum was preceded by a 1976 maritime session of the
International Labour Conference, which adopted the Merchant Shipping
(Minimum Standards) Convention, more commonly known as ILO
Convention No. 147.33 This Convention aimed at inspecting vessels that
entered the ports of member states.34 On March 2, 1978, the Hague
Memorandum was signed by the maritime authorities of eight countries that
decided that the ILO Convention deserved a proper follow up.35 The aim
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 6.
Id.
DR. Z. OYA ÖZÇAYR, PORT STATE CONTROL 121 (LLP 2nd ed. 2004) [hereinafter
ÖZÇAYR].
34. Convention Concerning Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships, Oct. 29, 1976, 68
U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 147].
35. George Kasoulides, Paris Memorandum of Understanding: A Regional Regime of
Enforcement, in THE NORTH SEA: PERSPECTIVES ON REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 180, 180 (David Freestone & Ton Ijlstra eds., 1990).
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of the memorandum was the surveillance of seagoing ships in order to
ensure that requirements stated under ILO Convention No. 147, as well as
other Conventions, were met.36 In March of 1978, just as the Hague
Memorandum was about to take effect, the Amoco Cadiz incident
happened.37 Consequently, this incident resulted in “strong political and
public outcry in Europe for far more stringent regulations with regard to the
safety of shipping.”38 Following these developments, the ministers
responsible for the maritime safety of fourteen European countries together
with the representatives of the Commission of the European Communities,
the IMO, and the International Labour Organization (ILO), met in Paris in
December, 1980.39 They agreed that the elimination of substandard
shipping would be best achieved by coordination of port states and
implementation of the provisions of a number of widely accepted
international maritime conventions, the so-called “relevant instruments.”40
In January of 1982, at a second ministerial conference, again in Paris, the
present Paris MOU on Port State Control was adopted and signed by the
maritime authorities of the fourteen states.41
Although the Paris MOU on Port State Control—the earliest regional
agreement of its kind—was signed in 1982, maritime authorities of most
states already had specific powers to exercise port state control under the
conventions to which they were parties. For instance, the control of foreign
merchant vessels by port states has been a feature of international maritime
conventions since the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) Convention (1929).42 The drafters of SOLAS, recognizing the
inability of states to constantly monitor ships in their fleet, allocated power
to port states to inspect vessels’ documentation.43 Hence, the powers used

36. Id.
37. The Paris MOU on Port State Control, A Short History, http://www.parismou.
org/ParisMOU/Organisation/About+Us/History/xp/menu.3950/default.aspx (last visited Mar.
1, 2009) [hereinafter A Short History].
38. Id.
39. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 121.
40. Id. at 122.
41. Id.
42. See generally International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, May 31, 1929,
136 L.N.T.S. 81 [hereinafter SOLAS]. The control of foreign merchant vessels by port
states has also been a focal issue in several other conventions. See International Convention
on Load Lines, art. 21, Apr. 5, 1966, 640 U.N.T.S. 133 (hereinafter LL 66); see also
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, as modified by the
Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, reg. 6, Feb. 16, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 [hereinafter
MARPOL 73/78); International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, art. X, July 7, 1978, 1361 U.N.T.S. 2 [hereinafter STCW 1978].
43. SOLAS, supra note 42, art. 54.
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by PSCOs are not new; it is the willingness to use these powers and the
coordinated application of port state control that is a relatively recent
development.
A memorandum of understanding is not an international convention;
rather, it is an administrative agreement that has been subscribed to and
executed in a framework of cooperation among the maritime authorities of
the party states. During the preparation of the Paris MOU, all countries
involved showed a political will to quickly see the practical results of their
study. They recognized that conventions usually require lengthy ratification procedures and that similar problems arise when amendments were
necessary.44 Therefore, memorandums of understanding are established
instead of conventions.
For the first time, with the Paris MOU, a regular and systematic control
of ships was exercised by a regional group of port states. The Paris MOU
is the model upon which other regions of the world have based their
agreements on port state control.45 Since its entry into force, the number
of states in the Paris MOU has grown.46 This has mainly been due to the
increase in the number of member states of the European Union (EU). On
July 1, 1996, the EU’s European Community (EC) Directive 95/21/EC on
port state control came into force and made port state control mandatory in
states that were members of the EU.47
B. The IMO Rules on Port State Control
The first resolution on procedures for the control of ships, IMO
Resolution A.466 (XII), was adopted by the IMO Assembly in 1981.48

44. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 122.
45. See, e.g., The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, Jan. 16,
1982, 21 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter Paris MOU]; The Acuerdo De Vina del Mar Agreement on
Port State Control of Vessels (Nov. 5, 1992) [hereinafter Latin American MOU]; The
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Asia-Pacific Region (Dec. 2,
1993) [hereinafter Tokyo MOU]; The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control
in the Mediterranean Region (July 11, 1997) [hereinafter Mediterranean MOU]; The
Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control for the Indian Ocean Region (June
5, 1998) [hereinafter Indian Ocean MOU]; The Memorandum of Understanding on Port
State Control for the West and Central Africa Region (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Abuja
MOU]; The Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control in the Black Sea Region
(Apr. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Black Sea MOU].
46. A Short History, supra note 37.
47. Council Directive 95/21, Concerning Port State Control, 1995 O.J. (L 157) (EC)
[hereinafter 95/21/EC].
48. See generally International Maritime Organization [IMO], Procedures For The
Control of Ships, A. Res. XII/466 (Nov. 19, 1981) available at http://www.imo.org/ (follow
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Since 1981, the resolution has been amended in response to new
developments in the shipping world, and there is no doubt that there will be
future amendments. In 1995, the Assembly of the IMO made the first
amendments to A.466 (XII) by adopting Resolution A.787(19), entitled
“Procedures for Port State Control.”49 Resolution A.787(19) was amended
in 1999, by Resolution A.882(21), which is the current version of the IMO
Procedures for Port State Control.50 The new resolution provides basic
guidance on how to conduct port state control inspections; encourages
consistency in the conduct of these inspections and control procedures; and
clarifies the procedure for assessing the deficiencies of a ship, its
equipment, or its crew.51 These procedures are not mandatory and only
offer guidance to port states.52 Although the participating port state control
regions are supposed to follow the IMO procedures when exercising port
state control, in practice, it has been clear that port state control regions
have interpreted and implemented these procedures in a number of different
ways.
C. Basic Principles of MOUs
The MOUs invoke international instruments that are legally binding for
states.53 Their aim is to eliminate the operation of substandard ships
through a harmonized system of port state control. They do not set any new
standards or enforce any requirements on foreign merchant vessels above
the international convention requirements.54 They aim to ensure that all

“Information Resources” hyperlink; then follow “Index of IMO Resolutions” hyperlink; then
follow “Assembly (A)” hyperlink; then follow “A.466 (XII)” hyperlink) (last visited Mar.
6, 2009).
49. International Maritime Organization, Procedures for the Control of Ships, A. Res.
19/787, at 2 (Nov. 23, 1995) available at http://www.imo.org/ (follow “Information
Resources” hyperlink; then follow “Index of IMO Resolutions” hyperlink; then follow
“Assembly (A)” hyperlink; then follow “A.787(19)” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6, 2009).
50. See International Maritime Organization, Amendments to Procedures for Port State
Control, A. Res. 21/882, at 1 (Nov. 25, 1999) available at http://www.imo.org/ (follow
“Information Resources” hyperlink; then follow “Index of IMO Resolutions” hyperlink; then
follow “Assembly (A)” hyperlink; then follow “A.882(21)” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 6,
2009).
51. See generally INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, PROCEDURES FOR PORT
STATE CONTROL (2001) [hereinafter PROCEDURES FOR PORT STATE CONTROL].
52. Id. ¶ 1.1.
53. Paris MOU on Port State Control, Relevant Instruments, http://www.
parismou.org/ParisMOU/Organisation/About+Us/Instruments/default.aspx (last visited Mar.
14, 2009) [hereinafter Instruments].
54. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 123.
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ships operating in their region meet international standards. Thus “[o]nly
internationally accepted conventions shall be enforced during port State
control inspections.”55 A port state can only apply those conventions that
have entered into force and which it has implemented for its own ships.56
Because of the principle of “no more favourable treatment” ships that fly
the flag of a state which are not a party to that convention or which are
below convention size are not exempt from inspection.57
The basic principles of regional MOUs may be generally stated as
follows:
1. Shipowners and operators are ultimately responsible for
compliance with the requirements expressed in international
maritime conventions. The responsibility for ensuring such
compliance remains with the flag state.
2. Each maritime authority gives effect to the provisions of the
relevant MOUs.
3. Each authority must ensure that foreign merchant ships visiting
its ports comply with the standards articulated in the relevant
conventions and all amendments thereto in force. In this
context, a participating maritime authority regards a ship flying
the flag of another member state as a foreign ship too.
4. The MOUs provide for a total number of inspections,
expressed in terms of a percentage, that each of the states party
to the relevant MOU shall conduct. IMO and ILO conventions
provide the basis for inspections under the MOUs.
5. All possible efforts are made to avoid unduly detaining or
delaying a ship.
6. In principle, there will be no discrimination as to flag.
7. Inspections are generally unannounced.
8. In general, ships will not be inspected within six months of a
previous inspection in an MOU port, unless there are “clear
grounds” for inspection.58
Under many IMO Conventions, ships are required to carry certificates
onboard to provide proof of inspection and to demonstrate compliance with
international standards.59 These certificates are accepted as documents of

55. Instruments, supra note 53.
56. PROCEDURES FOR PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 51, ¶ 1.2.3.
57. Id. ¶ 1.2.2.
58. Res. 21/882, supra note 50. This list provides the general rules applicable to all
regional MOUs and they are all based on the main frame of the Paris MOU.
59. See PROCEDURES FOR PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 51, ¶ 2.2.3, App. 4.
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proof by different port authorities that a ship is in compliance with the
required standards.60 Inspections should be limited to a check of a ship’s
certificates and to reported or observed deficiencies, if any,61 unless there
are clear grounds that the condition of the ship, its equipment, or its crew
do not substantially correspond with the particulars of these certificates,62
“or that the master or crew members are not familiar with essential
shipboard procedures relating to the safety of ships or the prevention of
pollution.”63 In the event that an inspection reveals problems, a port state
can take further action to either delay the departure of the ship or detain it.64
In the past, this has been interpreted to mean that the inspection should stop
once the PSCO has been shown a set of valid certificates.65 Experience has
shown, however, that valid certificates are no guarantee of a ship’s
compliance with the conventions. The control procedures may allow for
the enforcement of compliance with onboard operational requirements,
particularly if the PSCO has a reason to believe that the crew demonstrates
insufficient proficiency in that area.
A PSCO may conduct an inspection based on a report or notification
by another authority or a report or complaint by the master, a crew member,
or organization with a legitimate interest in the safe operation of the ship.
Multiple factors can dictate whether there are “clear grounds” to conduct
a more detailed inspection:
1. the absence of principal equipment or arrangements required
by the conventions;
2. evidence from a review of the ship’s certificates that a
certificate or certificates is clearly invalid;
3. evidence that documentation required by the conventions and
listed in appendix 4 are not onboard, incomplete, are not
maintained or are falsely maintained;
4. evidence from the PSCO’s general impression and general
observations that serious hull or structural deteriorations or
deficiencies exist that may place the structural, watertight, or
weather-tight integrity of the ship at risk;
5. evidence from the PSCO’s general impressions and observations that serious hull or structural deterioration or deficiencies

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. ¶ 2.2.3.
Id. ¶ 2.2.4.
Id. ¶ 2.2.5.
Id. ¶ 1.6.1.
Id. ¶ 4.7.2.
ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 134.
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exist that may place at risk the structural, watertight or weather
tight integrity of the ship;
evidence from the PSCO’s general impression or observations
that serious deficiencies exist in the safety, pollution prevention or navigational equipment;
indications that key crew members may not be able to communicate with each other or with other persons on board;
the emissions of false distress alerts not followed by proper
cancellation procedures;
receipt of a report or complaint containing information that a
ship appears to be substandard.66
D. Port State Control Officers

A PSCO’s powers derive solely from the sovereign state which
employs him or her, and the PSCO is subject to the national laws of the
jurisdiction under which he or she is operating.67 The PSCO should be an
experienced person “qualified as a flag State surveyor” and “should be able
to communicate in English with key crew members.”68 The PSCO should
be qualified as a master or chief engineer and have seagoing experience.69
In principle, the PSCO should not have any commercial interest in the port,
the ship, or be employed by, or on behalf of, a classification society.70
All PSCOs carry an identity card issued by their maritime authorities
as evidence of their authority to carry out inspections.71 Inspections may
be carried out by a single PSCO or a team of PSCOs, depending to some
extent on the size and type of ship and the resources available on any
particular day. The role of a PSCO is extremely important, because his or
her powers are extensive and include: (1) straightforward inspections of a
ship; (2) stoppage of cargo or other specific operations; and (3) detention
of the vessels exhibiting deficiencies that are clearly hazardous to safety,
health, or the environment; such detention may be enforced without a court
order.72

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

PROCEDURES FOR PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 51, ¶ 2.3.
Id. ¶ 1.6.6.
Id. ¶¶ 2.5.1-.2.
Id. ¶ 2.5.5.
Id. ¶ 2.4.3.
Id. ¶ 2.4.4.
Id. ¶ 2.6.
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1. The Inspection Process
Port State Control (PSC) inspections may be on a random, escalated,
or targeted/periodical basis. The following types of PSC inspections are
used in: (1) initial inspections (random); (2) detailed inspections
(escalated); and (3) expanded inspections (targeted/periodical).73
2. Detention
When a PSCO finds deficiencies, he or she may require that certain
actions be taken, which include: (1) reification of deficiencies prior to
departure; (2) reification of deficiencies in the next port, under specific
conditions; and (3) reification of (minor) deficiencies (only) within
fourteen days; and (4) the detention of the ship.74 Following an inspection,
the PSCO must decide the necessary course of action to correct the
deficiencies found and the time within which the corrections are to be
made.75 If the deficiencies found are serious, the PSCO has to decide
whether he or she should prevent the ship from sailing until the deficiencies
are rectified.76
A PSCO’s decision as to whether a ship ought to be detained is a
delicate one. The decision to detain a vessel is based on the professional
judgment of the PSCO. If deficiencies are revealed during a PSCO
inspection, which are “clearly hazardous to safety or the environment,” the
PSCO must ensure that those deficiencies are corrected before the vessel
is allowed to sail.77 The authority may detain the vessel in order to ensure
that deficiencies are rectified, and in practice this is often done.78 Despite
the guidelines provided to assist PSCOs in making such judgments, the
PSCO’s determination that the deficiencies are so clearly hazardous to
warrant a detention involves subjectivity. A PSCO may detain a vessel if
there is one deficiency of such serious nature that it warrants the vessel’s
detention, or if there is a combination of deficiencies that may not

73. See id. ¶¶ 1.6.4, 1.6.5, 2.1, 2.3. The IMO guidelines outline exactly what should be
examined during a detailed inspection. See id. ¶¶ 3.1-3.3.23. While the IMO guidelines
may serve as a consistent reference point, professional judgment is ultimately used to
determine the appropriate level of inspection in any given circumstance.
74. Id. ¶ 4.7.
75. Id.
76. Id. ¶ 2.6.5.
77. Id. ¶ 4.7.2.
78. Id. ¶ 2.6.5.
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individually warrant detention, but when viewed together with other
deficiencies, are seriously sufficient to warrant a vessel’s detention.
The regional MOUs and Council Directive 95/21/EC provide a list of
deficiencies which are considered to be of such a serious nature that they
may warrant the detention of the ship involved.79 In order to assist the
PSCO, deficiencies are grouped either under relevant conventions or codes.
These lists are only guides and should not be seen as an exhaustive list of
detainable items. The decision to detain requires the PSCO’s professional
judgment, which is precisely why the knowledge, experience, integrity, and
independence of the PSCO are particularly important.
When a PSCO decides to detain a ship, he or she will immediately
inform the master of the ship and advise him to seek assistance and to
arrange remedial action in order to avoid delaying the ship.80 Following a
detention, the PSCO is immediately required to inform both the flag state
and the classification society (if it has issued statutory certificates) of the
detention.81 This notification includes the PSCO’s report of inspection.
A detained ship will only be released once the PSCO is satisfied that
the asserted deficiencies have been properly corrected.82 In cases where
some repairs cannot be carried out in the port of detention, the PSCO may
allow the ship to proceed to a repair yard as long as adequate temporary
repairs are made, and it is safe for the ship to make the voyage.83
V. PORT STATE CONTROL SYSTEMS
The port state control system is operating under two major systems
around the world. One is the group of regional-based memorandums of
understanding,84 and the other is the independent United States port state
control system.

79. See The Paris MOU, supra note 45; The Latin American MOU, supra note 45; The
Tokyo MOU, supra note 45; The Mediterranean MOU, supra note 45; The Indian Ocean
MOU, supra note 45; The Abuja MOU, supra note 45; The Black Sea MOU, supra note 45;
95/21/EC, supra note 47.
80. PROCEDURES FOR PORT STATE CONTROL, supra note 51, ¶¶ 2.6.5, 5.1.1.
81. Id. ¶ 5.1.3.
82. See id. ¶ 4.7.1.
83. Id. ¶ 4.7.3.
84. At present, there are eight regional agreements on port state control. See generally
The Paris MOU, supra note 45; The Latin American Agreement, supra note 45; The Tokyo
MOU, supra note 45; The Caribbean MOU, supra note 45; The Mediterranean MOU, supra
note 45; The Indian Ocean MOU, supra note 45; The Abuja MOU, supra note 45; The
Black Sea MOU, supra note 45.
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The Paris MOU has been a model for all other regional agreements.
Through the Paris MOU, a regional group of port states, who were parties
to the relevant maritime conventions, exercised regular and systematic
control of ships entering their ports for the first time. The Paris MOU was
initially signed by fourteen European countries.85
As compared to other regional agreements, the Paris MOU has always
been the most strict port state control system. The Paris MOU constantly
undergoes changes in order to update the memorandum so that it is
consistent with the changes of the EU Directive on Port State Control. It
has been updated thirty times since its entry into force in 1982, and the
thirtieth amendment was adopted on May 19, 2008 to become effective on
September 17, 2008.86
The United States does not take part in any of the regional agreements
on port state control. The United States undertakes control measures on a
unilateral basis. On May 1, 1994, the U.S. Coast Guard introduced its
revised Port State Control Initiative.87 The primary objective of this
initiative was to identify high risk foreign merchant ships based on the
performance records of their owners, operators, classification societies, and
flag states, to systematically target these ships for boarding.88
In the United States there is no agreement or memorandum of
understanding that is specifically dedicated to port state control. Therefore,
it is impossible to compile a conclusive list of conventions enforced by the
U.S. Coast Guard under its Port State Control Program. The United States
exercises its port state control authority through the U.S. Coast Guard’s
long-standing foreign vessel boarding program, now referred to as the Port
State Control Program.89

85. Paris MOU, supra note 45, at 1. The original countries that signed the MOU,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, were joined later by Bulgaria,
Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the
Russian Federation, and Slovenia. Id.
86. See The Paris MOU on Port State Control, The Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), http://www.parismou.org/ParisMOU/Organisation/Memorandum+of+Under
standing/xp/menu.3945/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
87. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 351.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 352.
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A. The Effects of the Erika and Prestige Incidents and 9/11 Terrorist
Attacks on Port State Control Regimes
During the early morning of December 12, 1999, the Maltese registered
tanker, the Erika, broke in two due to gale force winds while in the Bay of
Biscay approximately forty-five miles off the French Coast.90 The tanker
was carrying 30,844 tons of heavy fuel oil.91 About 400 kilometers of
beaches, including many popular holiday resorts were polluted by oil, and
thousands of seabirds were covered with it.92 The pollution from the Erika
and its loss produced a substantially greater effect than any other pollution
incident in Europe, such as the Braer, the Sea Empress, and the Aegean
Sea.93 Although these incidents had resulted in legal liability, they did not
affect the European political agenda as much as the Erika. The Erika
reflected the polyglot nature of the tanker industry. The chartered ship was
French, the management company Italian, the crew Indian, and the flag
Maltese.94 The Erika was not the only incident to involve so many

90. MALTA MARITIME AUTHORITY, REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE LOSS OF THE
MOTOR TANKER ERIKA ON SUNDAY 12 DECEMBER 1999, at Executive Summary (2000)
[hereinafter MALTA MARITIME AUTHORITY].
91. Id. § 1.1.2.
92. See id.
93. The Aegean Sea grounded at La Coruña, Spain, in heavy weather in 1992. Tanker
Spills Oil in Spanish Harbor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at A9. The ship broke in two and
caught fire. Id. Seventy-two thousand tons of oil were spilled and wide environmental
damage resulted. Id. Following this incident and other pollution incidents that took place
between 1990 and 1995, extensive amendments were made to MARPOL 73/78 including
requirements under Annex I for double hulls on new tankers and enhanced surveys for
existing tankers. Z. Oya Özçayr, The IMO and Recent Oil Pollution Incidents, 9 J. INT’L
MAR. L. 185, 193 (2003). Extensive amendments were made to SOLAS 1974, including the
mandatory introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code effective from
1988 have been adopted. Id.
In 1993, Braer, laden with 84,000 tons of North Sea crude, experienced engine
failure south of Shetland Islands, United Kingdom. Id. The ship was driven ashore in severe
weather and broke up on coastal rocks. Id. All cargo and bunker oil escaped. Id. As a
result of the Braer incident, the Donaldson Inquiry was created by the United Kingdom. Id.
In 1994 a conference was held to agree on major amendments to the International
Convention on Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping. Id.
The Sea Empress stranded off the entrance to Milford Haven, United Kingdom, when
entering port in 1996. Id. Bad weather made refloating difficult and 65,000 tons of oil
leaked into the sea and caused grave damage to highly sensitive coastal areas and fishing.
Id. The ship was eventually floated and taken into harbor, where remaining oil was
transferred to other ships. Id. Following this incident, in 1996, the International Conference
on Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea was held. Id.
94. MALTA MARITIME AUTHORITY, supra note 90, § 14.16.
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nationalities in the management of a vessel, but no other had the same
attraction.
The Erika was different from many previous incidents, as it carried the
required certificates, was under class, and had been inspected by port states,
flag states, and industry inspectors on several occasions.95 Nevertheless,
the vessel slipped through the whole series of safety nets.
At the time of her sinking, all of the Erika’s class and statutory certificates were valid.96 She was classed with Registro Italiano Navale (RINA),
a full member of International Association of Classification Societies
(IACS).97 The ship was under the management of an Italian company,
which was International Safety Management certified by RINA.98 Between
1991 and 1999, the Erika was inspected sixteen times by PSCOs and twice
by her flag state’s control inspectors.99 She also went through vetting inspections undertaken by the major oil companies and surveys carried out
by the classification societies.100 Several oil companies chartered the Erika
throughout the 1990s.101 The inspectors of Texaco, Exxon’s subsidiary
Standard Marine, Repsol, and Shell approved her as a fit vessel to carry
their cargoes.102 The vessel was also approved by TotalFina, whose cargo
she was carrying when she sank.103 The Erika raised the pollution issue to
the top of the European political agenda and prompted a huge legislative
overhaul.
In November of 2002, not long after the Erika incident, the oil tanker
Prestige broke in two and sank off the Northwest coast of Spain while
carrying 77,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.104 With the Prestige incident, the
maritime industry faced questions similar to those encountered with the
Erika incident. Like the Erika, the Prestige had been through port state
control inspections six times since 1998, with no record of detentions and
had only four minor deficiencies.105 It was built according to American
Bureau of Shipping classification requirements, and at the time of the
incident the vessel was in full compliance with all ABS classification

95. See ÖZÇAYR, supra note 36, at 292-94.
96. Id. at 291.
97. MALTA MARITIME AUTHORITY, supra note 90, § 14.16.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 8.1.
100. Id.
101. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 291.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. John Tagliabue, Gas Tanker Strikes Shipwreck in English Channel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
2, 2003, at A7.
105. See ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 298.
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requirements.106 The vessel was subject to a comprehensive regime of
safety and environmental regulations including those of the main IMO conventions, such as the Safety of Life at Sea and the International Convention
on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). The vessel’s phase
out date under MARPOL would have been 2005.107
On March 21, 2000, the European Commission adopted its first
package of post-Erika measures in the form of the “Communication on the
Safety of Seaborne Oil Trade” (Erika I package).108 Following that, on
December 6, 2000, the European Commission adopted a second set of
community measures on maritime safety in the form of the “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council”
(Erika II package).109
Both the Erika I and II packages aimed to achieve the same objectives,
such as tightening existing legislation on both port state control and
classification societies.110 The packages also sought to propose new
measures to speed up the phasing out of single hull tankers to improve
controls on shipping in European waters, to establish a European Maritime
Safety Agency (EMSA), and to create a supplementary fund to provide
compensation to the victims of the pollution.111
Following the Prestige incident, a new study developed the Community
Computer Network, a network for monitoring shipping aimed at facilitating
the identification of ships at risk once they enter into European waters.112
Studies also started to accommodate ships in stress in places of refuge.113

106. Press Release, American Bureau of Shipping, ABS Releases Report on “Technical
Analyses Related to the Prestige Casualty” Calls for International Guidelines on Places of
Refuge (Mar. 4, 2003), available at http://www.eagle.org/news/press/mar04-03.html.
107. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 296.
108. See generally The Commission of European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Safety of the Seaborne Oil
Trade, COM (2000) 142 final (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Safety of Seaborne Oil Trade].
109. See generally Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on a Second Set of Community
Measures on Maritime Safety Following the Sinking of the Oil Tanker the Erika, COM
(2000) 802 final (Dec. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Measures on Maritime Safety].
110. Safety of the Seaborne Oil Trade, supra note 108, at 5; Measures on Maritime Safety,
supra note 109, at 2.
111. Safety of the Seaborne Oil Trade, supra note 108, at 5-6; Measures on Maritime
Safety, supra note 109, at 2-5.
112. Council Directive 2002/59, Establishing a Community Vessel Traffic Monitoring and
Information System, art.1, 2002 O.J. (L 208) 10 (EC).
113. International Maritime Organization, Sub-committee on Safety of Navigation-47th
session, 2-6 July 2001, available at http://www.imo.org/About/mainframe.asp?topic_id=
112&doc_id=1138 (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).
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The EMSA’s powers have been expanded to cover maritime security and
seafarer’s qualifications.114
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a new stage in port
state control began. In November of 2002, the United States passed a
domestic law called the Maritime Security Transportation Act of 2002
(MTSA 2002).115 The following month, the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code116 was adopted by the IMO.117 The MTSA
2002 and the ISPS Code represent a significant expansion of port state
control activities.
Both the Erika and Prestige incidents, as well as the 9/11 attacks,
initiated a process of change towards a maritime policy at the European
level and the incorporation of maritime security as part of maritime
transport policy. New amendments were made to the Paris MOU to bring
the memorandum in line with the latest changes of the EU Directive on Port
State Control.118 The U.S. Port State Control Program underwent changes
to implement the maritime security policy issued under the MTSA 2002
and the ISPS Code.
The effects of the Erika and Prestige incidents were also seen in the
work of the IMO. Following these incidents, the IMO acted to raise the
limits for oil pollution compensation and to implement mandatory ship
reporting, traffic separation, and routing systems. Moreover, the IMO
created agreements on the phase out of single hull tankers, set guidelines
on places of refuge for ships in need of assistance, and adopted the new
ISPS Code.119
VI. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE PARIS 1982 MOU
By becoming parties to the Paris MOU, each member state authority
commits itself to a specified enforcement regime regarding port state
control and undertakes to comply with the following:

114. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 349.
115. Maritime Security Transportation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064
(Nov. 25, 2002).
116. International Maritime Organization [IMO], International Ship and Port Facility
(ISPS) Code, IMO Doc. SOLAS/CONF/5/34 (Dec. 17, 2002).
117. International Maritime Organization [IMO], Implementation of SOLAS Chapter X1-2
and the ISPS Code, IMO Doc. MSC/Cir.1104 (Jan. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Implementation
of SOLAS].
118. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 124.
119. Implementation of SOLAS, supra note 117.
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1. The primary responsibility for compliance with the provisions
of the relevant instruments lies with the shipowner/operator.
The responsibility for ensuring such compliance remains with
the flag state.120
2. Each maritime authority is to give effect to the provisions of
the Paris Memorandum.121
3. Each authority has to ensure that foreign merchant ships
visiting its ports comply with the standards outlined in the
relevant conventions and all amendments thereto in force,122
and “[e]ach Authority may also carry out controls on ships at
off-shore installations.”123 In this context, a participating
maritime authority regards a ship flying the flag of another
member state as a foreign ship.124
4. The member states agree to inspect twenty-five percent of the
estimated number of individual foreign merchant ships that
enter their ports during a twelve-month period.125
5. The Paris MOU provides that the IMO and ILO conventions
provide the basis for inspections.126
6. Efforts shall be made to avoid unduly detaining or delaying a
ship.127
7. In principle, there will be no discrimination as to flag.128
8. Inspections are generally unannounced.129
9. In practice, “[e]ach Authority will consult, cooperate, and
exchange information with the other Authorities in order to
further the aims of the Memorandum.”130
Under the Paris MOU, various internationally accepted conventions,
which are referred to as “relevant instruments,” shall be enforced.131 Each

120. The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, The Basic
Principles, http://www.parismou.org/ParisMOU/Organisation/About+Us/Principles/defau
lt.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Basic Principles].
121. Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 1.1.
122. Id. § 1.2.
123. Id.
124. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 123.
125. Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 1.3.
126. Basic Principles, supra note 120.
127. Id.
128. Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 1.2.
129. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 124.
130. Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 1.4.
131. Id. § 2.1. The “relevant instruments” are as follows:
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state that is a party to the Paris MOU will apply the applicable conventions
that are currently in force. Amendments to these conventions will be
accepted as relevant instruments, and will be enforced through a member
state’s exercise of port state control, as long as the amendments are both in
force and have been accepted by the member state.
B. Targeting Factors
Under the Paris MOU, certain selection criteria, such as the ship’s flag,
age, and type, are evidence of both how well a ship is likely to be operated
and in what condition that ship is likely to be found. Targeting factors are
used to focus inspection efforts on those ships that are most likely to be
found substandard. The Paris MOU has developed a computerized
targeting formula as part of its database system in order to help PSCOs rank
priority ships.132 As a result of this formula, there is a target factor for each
individual ship.133 By allocating points to each criterion, a scoring system

1.
2.

The International Convention on Load Lines, 1966 (LOAD LINES 66);
The Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention on Load Lines,
1966 (LL PROT 88);
3. The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS 74);
4. The Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS PROT 78);
5. The Protocol of 1988 relating to the International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS PROT 88);
6. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973,
as modified by the Protocols of 1978 and 1997 relating thereto (MARPOL
73/78);
7. The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW 78);
8. The Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
Sea, 1972 (COLREG 72);
9. The International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships, 1969
(TONNAGE 69);
10. The Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 (ILO
Convention No. 147) (ILO 147);
11. The Protocol of 1996 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards)
Convention, 1976 (ILO Convention No. 147) (ILO147 PROT 96);
12. The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992;
and
13. The International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems
on Ships, 2001 (AFS2001).
Id. § 2.1.1-.13.
132. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 131.
133. Id.
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is employed and a ship is assigned a targeting factor.134 The target factor
value of each ship is calculated in the central Paris MOU PSC database
(SIRENAC) on the basis of a ship’s profile and inspection history.135 The
Paris MOU has developed a wide range of relevant elements for target
factors:136
1. Ships visiting a port of a State, the Authority of which is a
signatory to the Memorandum, for the first time or after an
absence of 12 months or more. In the absence of appropriate
data for this purpose, the Authorities will rely upon the
available SIReNaC data and inspect those ships which have
not been registered in the SIReNaC following the entry into
force of that database on 1 January 1993;
2. Ships not inspected by any Authority within the previous 6
months;
3. Ships whose statutory certificates on the ship’s construction
and equipment, issued in accordance with the Conventions,
and the classification certificates, have been issued by an
organization which is not recognized by the Authority;
4. Ships flying the flag of a State appearing in the black-list as
published in the annual report of the MOU;
5. Ships which have been permitted by the Authority to leave a
port of its State on certain conditions:
a) deficiency to be rectified before departure
b) deficiency to be rectified at the next port
c) deficiencies to be rectified within 14 days
d) deficiencies for which other conditions have been
specified
e) if ship related action has been taken and all deficiencies
have been rectified;
6. Ships for which deficiencies have been recorded during a
previous inspection, according to the number of deficiencies;
7. Ships which have been detained in a previous port;
8. Ships flying the flag of a non-Party to a relevant instrument;
9. Ships with recognized organization deficiency ratio above
average;
10. Ships in a category referred to in section 8 of Annex I which
are:

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Paris MOU, supra note 45, Annex I, § 1.2.
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a)

Oil tankers with a gross tonnage of more than 3000 and
older than 15 years of age, as determined on the basis of
the date of construction indicated in the ship’s safety
certificates.
b) Bulk carriers, older than 12 years of age, as determined
on the basis of the date of construction indicated in the
ship’s safety certificates;
c) Passenger ships older than 15 years of age other than roro ferries and high-speed passenger craft operating in
regular service under the provision of Council Directive
1999/35/EC;
d) Gas and chemical tankers older than 10 years of age, as
determined on the basis of the date of construction
indicated in the ship’s safety certificates.
11. Other ships above 13 years old.137
C. Inspections
1. Initial Inspection
During an initial inspection, the PSCO will, at a minimum and to the
extent applicable, inspect a number of certificates and documents that a
ship is required to carry.138 In addition to document control, a PSCO is also
required to inspect several areas of the vessel, including the engine room,
and must be satisfied that both the accommodations for passengers and
crew, and the hygienic condition of the ship complies with the requirements
under the ship’s certificates.139 The certificates and documents that a PSCO
should check during the initial inspection are numerous.140

137. Id. Annex I, § 1.2.1-.11.
138. Id. § 3.1.
139. Id.
140. Id. Annex I, § 2. During the initial inspection, the PSCO should inspect the
following certificates and documents:
1. International Tonnage Certificate (1969);
2. Passenger Ship Safety Certificate;
3. Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate;
4. Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate;
5. Cargo Ship Safety Radio Certificate;
6. Exemption Certificate;
7. Cargo Ship Safety Certificate;
8. Document of Compliance (SOLAS 74, Regulation II-2/54)
9. Dangerous goods special list or manifest, or detailed stowage plan;
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10. International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk,
or the Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk,
whichever is appropriate;
11. International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Dangerous Chemicals in
Bulk, or the Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Dangerous Chemicals in
Bulk, whichever is appropriate;
12. International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate;
13. International Pollution Prevention Certificate for the Carriage of Noxious Liquid
Substances in Bulk;
14. International Load Line Certificate (1966);
15. International Load Line Exemption Certificate;
16. Oil Record Book, parts I and II;
17. Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan;
18. Cargo Record Book;
19. Minimum Safe Manning Document;
20. Certificates issued in accordance with STCW Convention;
21. Medical certificates (see ILO Convention No. 73);
22. Table of shipboard working arrangements (see ILO Convention No. 180 and
STCW 95);
23. Records of hours of work or rest of seafarers (see ILO Convention No. 180);
24. Stability information;
25. Copy of Document of Compliance and Safety Management Certificate issued in
accordance with the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention (IMO Resolutions A.741(18) and
A.788(19));
26. Certificates as to the ship’s hull strength and machinery installations issued by
the classification society in question (only to be required if the ship maintains
its class with a classification society);
27. Survey Report Files (in case of bulk carriers or oil tankers);
28. For ro-ro passenger ships, information on the A/A-max ratio;
29. Document of authorization for the carriage of grain;
30. Special Purpose Ship Safety Certificate;
31. High Speed Craft Safety Certificate and Permit to Operate High Speed Craft;
32. Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Safety Certificate;
33. For oil tankers, the record of oil discharge monitoring and control system for the
last ballast voyage;
34. The muster list, fire control plan, and for passenger ships, a damage control plan,
a decision – support system for the master (printed emergency plan);
35. Ship’s log book with respect to the records drills, including security drills, and
the log for records of inspection and maintenance of lifesaving appliances and
arrangements and fire fighting appliances and arrangements;
36. Reports of previous port State control inspections;
37. Cargo securing manual;
38. For passenger ships, list of operational limitations;
39. For passenger ships, a plan for co-operation with SAR-services;
40. Bulk carrier booklet;
41. Loading/Unloading Plan for bulk carriers;
42. Garbage Management Plan;
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2. More Detailed Inspection
If the vessel does not carry the relevant certificates, or if the PSCO has
“clear grounds” from his or her general impressions that the condition of
the ship or its equipment does not correspond substantially with the
particulars of the certificates or that the master or crew is not familiar with
essential shipboard procedures, a more detailed inspection should be
carried out.141

43. Garbage Record Book;
44. Certificate of financial insurance or any other financial security in respect of
civil liability for oil pollution damage;
45. International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC);
46. Continuous Synopsis Record;
47. Record of AFS (AFS/R1.1.b);
48. International Anti-Fouling System Certificate (IAFS Certificate) ( AFS/R2.4);
[sic]
49. Declaration on AFS (AFS/R5).
Id.
141. Id. § 3.1. The Paris MOU provides many examples that constitute “clear grounds”
for conducting a more detailed inspection:
1. the ship has been identified as a priority case for inspection, under section 1.1
and sections 1.2.3, 1.2.4, 1.2.5b, 1.2.5.c, and 1.2.8 of this Annex;
2. during examination of the certificates and documents referred to in section 2 of
this Annex, inaccuracies have been revealed or the documents have not been
properly kept or updated;
3. indications that the relevant crew members are unable to communicate
appropriately with each other, or with other persons on board, or that the ship
is unable to communicate with the shore-based authorities either in a common
language or in the language of those authorities;
4. evidence of cargo and other operations not being conducted safely or in
accordance with IMO guidelines;
5. failure of the master of an oil tanker to produce the record of the oil discharge
monitoring and control system for the last ballast voyage;
6. absence of an up-to-date muster list, or crew members not aware of their duties
in the event of fire or an order to abandon the ship;
7. the emission of false distress alerts not followed by proper cancellation
procedures;
8. the absence of principal equipment or arrangements required by the conventions;
9. evidence from the port State control officer’s general impressions and
observations that serious hull or structural deterioration or deficiencies exist that
may place at risk the structural, watertight or weather tight integrity of the ship;
10. excessively unsanitary conditions on board the ship;
11. information or evidence that the master or crew is not familiar with essential
shipboard operations relating to the safety of ships or the prevention of
pollution, or that such operations have not been carried out;
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3. Mandatory Inspection
Following the Erika and Prestige incidents, the EU introduced the
concept of mandatory inspections on high risk ships through Directive
2001/106/EC.142 This has been incorporated into the Paris MOU and has
been made applicable to all member states of the Paris MOU since July 22,
2003.143 Under this new scheme, ships of a certain age and type are
specifically selected for the purpose of conducting expanded inspections.144
A ship with a target factor greater than fifty will be inspected if it has been
at least one month since it was last inspected by a member state.145 These
types of ships are required to notify the port state of its arrival if it has been
more than twelve months since the ship has been inspected by a PSCO of
a member state.146
4. Mandatory Expanded Inspections
Under the amended Paris MOU, certain vessels are identified as high
risk and port state control inspections are mandatory for them after twelve
months from their last “expanded inspection.”147 This inspection must be
carried out at the first port the vessel visits after a period of twelve months
since its last expanded inspection.148 Vessels defined as high risk include:
(1) oil tankers over fifteen years old and with more than 3000 gross
tonnage; (2) gas and chemical tankers over ten years old; (3) bulk carriers
over twelve years old; and (4) passenger ships over fifteen years old.149 If
a vessel becomes eligible for an expanded inspection, it should give either
three days notice of arrival to the member port state that it is calling at, or

12. the absence of a table of shipboard working arrangements or records of hours of
work or rest of seafarers (see ILO180).
Id. Annex I, § 4.
142. The Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control, Ship Notification
Information for Masters, Ship Owners & Ship Agents of Foreign Flag Ships,
http://www.parismou.org/ParisMOU/home/MEI/xp/menu.3985/default.aspx (last visited
Mar. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Ship Notification Information]. See also Council Directive
2001/106, 2001 O.J. (L. 19) 17 (EC).
143. Ship Notification Information, supra note 142.
144. Id.
145. Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 3.2.
146. Id. § 3.3.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. Annex I, § 8.2.1-.4.
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give notice to the next port of destination before leaving the current port if
the voyage is expected to last less than three days.150
5. Priority Inspections
Each state or port may have its own priority list of ships to be inspected
depending on the types of vessels visiting their ports. Reports of complaints from ships’ crews, pilots, or port authorities, and incidents such as
collisions or groundings, are priority criteria that override a ship’s targeting
factor.151 Under the Paris MOU, certain ships shall be considered as an
overriding priority for inspection, regardless of the value of the target
factor.152

150.
151.
152.
1.

Ship Notification Information, supra note 142.
Paris MOU, supra note 45, Annex I, §§ 1.1.1, 1.1.4, 1.1.5.
Id. Annex I, § 1.1. Overriding factors that necessitate inspections include:
Ships which have been reported by pilots or port authorities in accordance with
section 1.5 of the Memorandum; [sic]
2. Ships carrying dangerous or polluting goods, which have failed to report all
relevant information concerning the ship's particulars, the ship's movements and
concerning the dangerous or polluting goods being carried to the competent
authority of the port and coastal State;
3. Ships which have been the subject of a report or notification by another
Authority;
4. Ships which have been the subject of a report or complaint by the master, a crew
member, or any person or organization with a legitimate interest in the safe
operation of the ship, shipboard living and working conditions or the prevention
of pollution, unless the Authority concerned deems the report or complaint to be
manifestly unfounded; the identity of the person lodging the report or complaint
must not be revealed to the master or the shipowner of the ship concerned;
5. Ships which have been:
involved in a collision, grounding or stranding on their way to the port,
accused of an alleged violation of the provisions on discharge of harmful
substances or effluents,
maneuvered in an erratic or unsafe manner whereby routing measures,
adopted by the IMO, or safe navigation practices and procedures have not
been followed, or
otherwise operated in such a manner as to pose a danger to persons,
property or the environment;
6. Ships which have been suspended or withdrawn from their class for safety
reasons in the course of the preceding [six] months.
7. Ships which cannot be identified in the SIReNaC information system.
Id. Annex I, § 1.1.1-.7.
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6. Concentrated Inspection Campaigns
Since 1995, the Paris MOU has introduced so-called “Concentrated
Inspection Campaigns” (CIC).153 The campaigns normally last a period of
three months and focus on a specific area of the ship, check on special
matters or areas of concern, or enforce new requirements that enter into
force.154 Among other issues, CICs address issues concerning pilot ladders,
oil record books, working and living conditions, ISM Implementation,
structural safety of bulk carriers, structural safety of oil tankers, and cargo
securing procedures.155 In 2005, the concentrated inspections were aimed
at the communication equipment onboard, with particular regard for the
global maritime distress and safety system (GMDSS). From February 1 to
April 30, 2006, a CIC was carried out in the context of MARPOL 73/78,
Annex I, Regulations 16 and 17. In September of 2007, the concentrated
campaign focused on the compliance with the International Safety
Management Code (ISM).156 Shipowners and charterers have to be
prepared for CICs and ensure that their vessels meet all required standards.
D. Detention
Annex I of the Paris MOU provides a list of defects that, under the
conventions, are regarded as grounds for detention. This list is only a guide
and it should not be seen as the definitive list of detainable items.157
Deficiencies that warrant detention in the area of STCW 78 are the sole
grounds for detention under this Convention.158 The decision to detain
requires the PSCO’s professional judgment.159 If the proper operation or
maintenance of inert gas systems or cargo related gear or machinery fails,
then detention may not be warranted, but the cargo operations of the vessel
have to be suspended.160 The various defects can be grouped under the
various conventions.161

153. ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 161.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 161-62.
156. Id.
157. Paris MOU, supra note 45, at Annex I, § 9.3.4.
158. Id. § 9.3.4.9.
159. Id. § 9.1.
160. Id. § 9.3.4.11.
161. Defects can be grouped according to their conventions:
Areas under SOLAS 74 (References are given in brackets)
1. failure of proper operation of propulsion and other essential machinery, as well
as electrical installations;
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insufficient cleanliness of engine room, excess amount of oily-water mixtures in
bilges, insulation of piping including exhaust pipes in engine room contaminated
by oil, improper operation of bilge pumping arrangements;
3. failure of the proper operation of emergency generator, lighting, batteries and
switches;
4. failure of the proper operation of the main and auxiliary steering gear;
5. absence, insufficient capacity or serious deterioration of personal lifesaving
appliances, survival craft and launching arrangements;
6. absence, non-compliance or substantial deterioration to the extent that it can not
comply with its intended use of fire detection system, fire alarms, fire fighting
equipment, fixed fire extinguishing installation, ventilation valves, fire dampers,
quick closing devices;
7. absence, substantial deterioration or failure of proper operation of the cargo deck
area fire protection on tankers;
8. absence, non-compliance or serious deterioration of lights, shapes or sound
signals;
9. absence or failure of the proper operation of the radio equipment for distress and
safety communication;
10. absence or failure of the proper operation of navigation equipment, taking the
provisions of Regulation V/12(o) of SOLAS 74 into account;
11. absence of corrected navigational charts, and/or all other relevant nautical
publications necessary for the intended voyage, taking into account that type
approved electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS) operating on
official data may be used as a substitute for the charts;
12. absence of non-sparking exhaust ventilation for cargo pump rooms (Regulation
II-2/59.3.1 of SOLAS 74);
13. serious deficiency in the operational requirements listed in 5.5 of Annex I [of the
Paris MOU];
14. number, composition or certification of crew not corresponding with safe
manning document;
15. failure to carry out the enhanced survey programme in accordance with SOLAS
74, Chapter XI, Regulation 2;
16. absence or failure of a VDR, when its use is compulsory.
Paris MOU, supra note 45, at Annex I, § 9.3.4.2.
Areas Under the IBC Code (References are given in brackets)
1. transport of a substance not mentioned in the Certificate of Fitness or missing
cargo information (16.2);
2. missing or damaged high-pressure safety devices (8.2.3);
3. electrical installations not intrinsically safe or corresponding to code requirements (10.2.3);
4. sources of ignition in hazardous locations referred to in 10.2 (11.3.15);
5. contraventions of special requirements (15);
6. exceeding of maximum allowable cargo quantity per tank (16.1);
7. insufficient heat protection for sensitive products (16.6).
Id. § 9.3.4.3.
Areas Under the ICG Code (References are given in brackets)
1. transport of a substance not mentioned in the Certificate of Fitness or missing
cargo information (18.1);
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missing closing devices for accommodations or service spaces (3.2.6);
bulkhead not gastight (3.3.2);
defective air locks (3.6);
missing or defective quick closing valves (5.6);
missing or defective safety valves (8.2);
electrical installations not intrinsically safe or not corresponding to code
requirements (10.2.4);
8. ventilators in cargo area not operable (12.1);
9. pressure alarms for cargo tanks not operable (13.4.1);
10. gas detection plant and/or toxic gas detection plant defective (13.6);
11. transport of substances to be inhibited without valid inhibitor certificate (17/19).
Id. § 9.3.4.4.
Areas Under LOADLINES 66
1. significant areas of damage or corrosion, or pitting of plating and associated
stiffening in decks and hull effecting seaworthiness or strength to take local
loads, unless proper temporary repairs for a voyage to a port for permanent
repairs have been carried out;
2. a recognized case of insufficient stability;
3. absence of sufficient and reliable information, in an approved form, which by
rapid and simple means, enables the master to arrange for the loading and
ballasting of his ship in such a way that a safe margin of stability is maintained
at all stages and at varying conditions of the voyage, and that the creation of any
unacceptable stresses in the ship's structure are avoided;
4. absence, substantial deterioration or defective closing devices, hatch closing
arrangements and water tight doors;
5. overloading;
6. absence of or impossibility to read draught mark.
Id. § 9.3.4.5.
Areas under Annex I to MARPOL 73/78 (References are given in brackets)
1. absence, serious deterioration or failure of proper operation of the oily-water
filtering equipment, the oil discharge monitoring and control system or the 15
ppm alarm arrangements;
2. remaining capacity of slop and/or sludge tank insufficient for the intended
voyage;
3. oil record book not available (20(5));
4. unauthorized discharge bypass fitted;
5. survey report file missing or not in conformity with Regulation 13G(3)(b) of the
Convention.
Id. § 9.3.4.6.
Areas under Annex II to MARPOL 73/78 (References are given in brackets)
1. absence of the P&A Manual;
2. cargo is not categorized (3(4));
3. no cargo record book available (9(6));
4. transport of oil-like substances without satisfying the requirements (14);
5. unauthorized discharge by-pass fitted.
Id. § 9.3.4.7.
Areas under Annex V to MARPOL 73/78
1. absence of the garbage management plan;
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When a PSCO decides to detain a ship, the master of the ship will be
immediately informed and advised to seek assistance and to arrange
remedial action in order to not delay the ship.162 Following a detention, the
PSCO officer is required to notify the flag state and the classification
society (if the statutory certificates are issued by the classification society),
without delay.163 This notification includes the PSCO’s report of
inspection.164
A detained ship will only be released once the PSCO is satisfied that
the deficiencies found have been properly rectified.165 In cases where some
repairs cannot be carried out in the port of detention, the PSCO may allow
2.
3.

no garbage record book available;
ship’s personnel not familiar with disposal/discharge requirements of garbage
management plan.
Id. § 9.3.4.8.
Areas under STCW 78
1. failure of seafarers to hold a certificate, to have an appropriate certificate, to
have a valid dispensation or to provide documentary proof that an application
for an endorsement has been submitted to the flag State Administration;
2. failure to comply with the applicable safe manning requirements of the flag State
Administration;
3. failure of navigational or engineering watch arrangements to conform to the
requirements specified for the ship by the flag State Administration;
4. absence in a watch of a person qualified to operate equipment essential to safe
navigation, safety radio communications or the prevention of marine pollution;
5. failure to provide proof of professional proficiency for the duties assigned to
seafarers for the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution;
6. inability to provide for the first watch at the commencement of a voyage and for
subsequent relieving watches persons who are sufficiently rested and otherwise
fit for duty.
Id. § 9.3.4.9.
Areas under ILO Conventions
1. insufficient food for voyage to next port;
2. insufficient potable water for voyage to next port;
3. excessively unsanitary conditions on board;
4. no heating in accommodation of a ship operating in areas where temperatures
may be excessively low;
5. excessive garbage, blockage by equipment or cargo or otherwise unsafe
conditions in passageways/accommodations;
6. clear evidence that watch keeping and other duty personnel for the first watch
or subsequent relieving watches are impaired by fatigue.
Id. § 9.3.4.10.
162. Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 3.14.
163. Id. § 3.10.2.
164. Id.
165. Id. § 9.3.2.
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the ship to proceed to a repair yard as long as adequate temporary repairs
are made, and it is safe for the ship to make the voyage.166
2. Detention Information
Like other aspects of the Paris MOU, the content of detention
information went through some changes. In the 1980s, flag states were
only provided with information on their ships when so requested.167 In
1993, a list was published for the first time of the flag states exceeding the
average detention percentage to be inspected on a priority basis.168 In 1994,
ships with poor safety records started to be named.169 The aim was to make
the maritime industry aware of the identity of those ships that were
continuously found in substandard condition. In its 1999 report, the Paris
MOU published three lists of flag states: (1) the “white list” indicating high
quality flags; (2) the “grey list” indicating flags with an average PSC
record; and (3) the “black list” indicating flags with a consistently poor
safety record.170 In 1999, the Paris MOU also started to publish a so-called
“Rustbucket of the Month” on its website.171 This publication provided
detention information describing particular detentions in detail with
photographic information of the detained vessel.172 Publication of
information concerning ships inspected includes the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Name of the ship;
IMO number;
Type of ship;
Tonnage;
Year of construction;
Name and address of the company of the ship;
In the case of ships carrying liquid or solid cargoes in bulk,
the name and address of the charterer responsible for the
selection of the vessel and the type of charter;
Flag State;
The classification society or classification societies, where
relevant, which has/have issued to this ship the class
certificates, if any;

Id. § 3.11.
ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The recognized organization or organizations and/or any
other party which has/have issued to this ship certificates in
accordance with the applicable conventions on behalf of the
flag state, stating the certificates delivered;
Country, port and date of inspection;
Number and nature of deficiencies.173

Publication information concerning detained ships includes nearly all
the information listed above and the following additional information:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

Port and date of the last special survey and the name of the
organization which carried out the survey;
Number of detentions during the 24 previous months;
Country and port of detention;
Date when the detention was lifted;
Duration of detention, in days;
Number of deficiencies found and the reasons for detention,
in clear and explicit terms;
Description of the measures taken by the competent
authority and, where relevant, by the recognized
organization as a follow-up to detention;
If the ship has been refused access to any port within the
region of the Memorandum, the reasons for such measure in
clear and explicit terms;
Indication, where relevant, of whether the recognized
organization or any other private body that carried out the
survey has a responsibility in relation to the deficiencies
which, alone or in combination, led to detention;
Description of the measures taken in the case of a ship
which has been allowed to proceed to the nearest
appropriate repair yard, or which has been refused access to
any port within the region of the Memorandum.174
E. Refusal of Access

Under the Paris MOU, a ship without ISM certificates on board must
be detained.175 If there are no other deficiencies warranting detention that
have been found, the detention may be lifted to avoid port congestion.176

173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Paris MOU, supra note 45, Annex 5.
Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 3.10.4.
Id.
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Such ships, however, will be banned from Paris MOU ports until valid ISM
certificates have been issued.177
After January 22, 2002, detentions count towards a ban, and a ship
registered with a flag on the blacklist will be refused access to ports in the
Paris MOU region.178 A vessel will be refused access after a second
detention within a three year period if it is in the “very high risk” or “high
risk” category on the blacklist.179 After a third detention in two years, a
vessel in a lower risk category on the blacklist may be refused access.180
Ships subject to refusal of access consist of gas and chemical tankers,
bulk carriers, oil tankers, and passenger ships.181 There is no tonnage or
age limitation for refusing such vessels.182 In order to lift the ban, the flag
state or the class (where it is appropriate), must certify that the ship
complies with required standards, and the ship must complete an expanded
inspection at the owner’s expense.183 In accordance with section 3.12.1 of
the Paris MOU, ships may be banned from a port if they jump detention or
fail to call at an indicated repair yard.184
VII. REVIEW OF PORT STATE CONTROL
Port state control has been on the maritime agenda for a long time and
has started to become an effective component of the shipping world with
the increased enforcement of regional maritime agreements. With the
continuous development of regional agreements, it is impossible for a
shipowner to trade without considering port state control.
There are many control systems in shipping, but none has been as
distressing as port state control for the shipowners. Shipping is international by definition, and it has sizeable economic turnover. Therefore,
economic advantage is the most common motivation for noncompliance
with international minimum standards. It is again the risk of loss of profit
which encourages or forces the shipowner to comply with required
international standards. Political and commercial aspects have always
come after financial considerations.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 156-57.
Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 3.10.5.
Id.
Id. Annex 3 § A.
ÖZÇAYR, supra note 33, at 157.
Paris MOU, supra note 45, Annex 3 § B.
Id. § 3.12.1.
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Shipowners always need to keep port state control in mind for their
trade because failure to comply with port state control requirements may
result in huge costs and may prevent a vessel from trading with certain
ports for a considerable period of time. The main principle of MOUs is
“name and shame.” Once a vessel is detained it will be on the list of
detained ships available on the website of the relevant MOU. In the past,
some vessels have tried to avoid inspections and resulting sanctions by
changing the vessel’s name; however, as every vessel is registered with a
unique IMO identification number, such means of escape have not been
successful. With the continuous development of regional MOUs,
especially the Paris MOU, the amount of information available on the
internet about a detained vessel is becoming more and more extensive. It
is not only the name of the shipowner that is available on the website, but
also the name of the relevant classification society, as well as the name and
address of the initial charterer of a ship carrying liquid or solid bulk
cargoes. The aim of port state control system is to provide as detailed
information as possible about the detained vessels in order to name all the
parties that took place in such unsafe vessel trading. Therefore, it is not
only the shipowners who need to take into account port state control, the
other characters of shipping practice such as flag states, charterers, and
classification societies need to consider the effects of port state control as
well.
In order not to be affected by a vessel’s bad history of inspections, a
charterer could check a prospective vessel’s port state control detention
history. This study should cover the port state control detention history for
all vessels under the same management and/or ownership, and would
provide detailed information on maintenance standards and work practices
of a vessel and her owner. Such data should be examined with caution by
keeping in mind the differences in port state control practices in order to
make sure that a prudent shipowner is not unreasonably penalized for minor
defects to a vessel.
Shipowners will also face the financial consequences if their ships are
found to be in substandard condition and detained. The Paris MOU
provides for all costs related to the inspection to be charged to the owner
or operator of the ship.185 The detention will not be lifted until full payment
has been made or a sufficient guarantee for reimbursement has been
given.186

185. Paris MOU, supra note 45, § 3.15.
186. Id. § 3.16.
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Is port state control a perfect system to eliminate substandard ships?
Like any other system in which human beings are involved, port state
control systems are open to abuse. Despite its ever increasing role in
policing the world’s fleets, port state control does not have a uniform
application in all different regions and sometimes not even within the same
region of the MOU. With the increase in the number of MOUs and the
member states of these MOU’s, the number of countries entitled to PSC
inspection increases. This enlargement increases the risk of varied
standards of inspectors and inspections. Therefore, even the establishment
of an internationally uniform standard of competence of inspectors will not
necessarily provide a solution; as such a standard could again be subject to
different interpretations.
There are basically two systems of port state control: (1) through
regional agreements; (2) through the U.S. port state control. Within the
regional agreements, the Paris MOU has become the most strict port state
control system. There are two reasons for such a practice. First, the Paris
MOU has the financial means, and second, the Paris MOU member states
are the European Union countries. The European Union is very keen on
improving maritime safety standards, especially following the Erika and
Prestige incidents.
The U.S. Port State Control system has been a notable exception with
tighter standards than the regional agreements. Following the 9/11 attacks,
maritime security also became part of the maritime policy development,
which in turn reflected tighter European and U.S. port state control
regimes. This general practice encouraged unsafe vessels to trade in other
parts of the world, where port state control could be avoided.
Despite the effective operation of the Paris MOU and the U.S. Port
State Control system, port state control cannot be applied in all parts of the
world because of financial and technical issues. For instance, South Africa
is situated on a particularly busy corner of the world’s major sea routes.
The weather conditions are frequently dreadful and many casualties occur,
but South African port state control is never as effective as a European port
due to insufficient funds and lack of trained personnel.
Another issue with port state control is that it can easily be used as a
political tool in order to demonstrate that certain flag states are not
performing their tasks as well as they should. Any deficiencies found or
detentions that occur for a vessel trading in her home port are not accounted
for in port state control figures, as these controls are flag state control
rather than port state control. Port state control is largely subjective. It is
possible for a port state control inspector to treat a deficiency as requiring
detention or correction before departure, depending on their professional
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judgment and possibly the general policy of the country or ports towards
port state control or the flag of the ship concerned.
Lastly, it is possible to ask for compensation for an unduly detained
ship, but the process is long, costly, and does not lift the detention order.
Therefore, instead of going through the legal process, the shipowners prefer
to sort out the problem in more practical ways.
This practice shows that port state control systems are going to remain
as the most effective control systems for shipping in a progressing world.
More than any other oil pollution incident, the Erika incident and 9/11 have
instigated a process of change in transport policies; however, the effective
use of the port state control legislative process should be universal. A
substandard vessel is a mobile property and could be anywhere on the
world seas. Therefore, effective port state control rules should be applied
globally; otherwise, we would only create ports of convenience for
substandard vessels. The goal should be creating safer ports throughout the
world and increasing effective implementation of international conventions.
The responsibility is not just on one party; rather flag states, port states,
shipowners, classification societies, international organizations, and
whoever is taking part in the shipping industry need to act together. These
different interested parties need to comply with the international rules and
regulations in order to achieve global cooperation and implementation.

